Preferences over income distribution are the basis for a variety of models that aim at explaining results in economic experiments. The direct evidence concerning these preferences, however, is limited to a relatively small set of games. The authors discuss crucial evidence, including that from a recent large-scale Internet experiment and the different models' performance. It appears that subjects are highly heterogeneous and that the relative impact of different motives depends on a variety of factors. The authors present a general model that can help as a starting point for measuring distributional preferences.
he classical economic model of the selfish rational decision maker fails quite miserably in some experiments (most famously, perhaps the ultimatum game by Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982 1 ), but does quite well in others (e.g., Bertrand games). In recent years, several attempts have been made to extend the model to bring it in line with the evidence. The attempts most prominent in applications have largely focused on preferences over the distribution of payoffs in the game-for example, the inequality aversion models by Fehr and Schmidt (1999 [henceforth F&S] ) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000 [henceforth B&O] ).
These models have been able to organize a large amount of the experimental evidence, mostly because they are able to rationalize why, in some games, such as the ultimatum game, a relatively small share of subjects who are concerned with fairness can have a large impact on the experimental outcome, while in other games, such as market games, even a relatively large share of nonselfish players would not lead to a deviation from the competitive market prediction.
A peculiarity of F&S and B&O is, however, that while the models assume players to be concerned only with the distribution of income from the experiment, they are motivated almost exclusively by strategic games, where much more than distributional concerns matter-most important, beliefs, strategic behavior, and reciprocity.
3 Basing the models only on distributional concerns had the great advantage of making them more tractable than alternative models that take concerns for reciprocity explicitly into account (e.g., Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004) . It is, however, striking that little direct evidence on distributional preferences has informed the models. The only nonstrategic game that is discussed in both studies is the classic dictator game (Forsythe et al. 1994) .
Only recently, more complicated experiments that provide direct evidence on distributional preferences have been conducted. 4 These fall broadly into two categories. First, there are multiplayer versions of the dictator game that have aimed at testing the distributional models explicitly (e.g., Charness and Rabin 2002 [henceforth C&R] ; Engelmann and Strobel 2004 [henceforth E&S] ; Cox and Sadiraj 2006 [henceforth C&S] ). Second, Cox (2004) , for example, separates distributional concerns from reciprocity by conducting experiments in a strategic version and nonstrategic controls, where the choice of one player is isolated as a dictator game. 5 These experiments have inspired alternative models that are based on convex altruistic preferences (C&R, C&S), similar to the model by Andreoni and Miller (2002 [henceforth A&M]) , which was inspired by systematic variations of costs in two-player dictator games.
When summarizing the evidence, we see that although preferences over the distribution of payoffs are at the heart of the above models, we know surprisingly little about them. The evidence is limited and the results not very robust despite the fact that purely distributional experiments should be the easiest playground for these models since there are no confounding effects of reciprocity or strategic concerns. It appears that a large variety of distributional motives (maximin preferences, efficiency concerns, inequality aversion, and competitiveness) have an impact on the choices in purely distributional games. In a large-scale Internet experiment, we have isolated these motives and found some evidence for a role of most of them.
In the next section, we present the most prominent recent models of distributional preferences. We also later discuss crucial evidence from two-player dictator games, the evidence from multiplayer dictator games, and our Internet experiment. Then we present a general distributional model that can organize most of the data and might be a useful starting point for testing distributional preferences. The last section concludes.
Prominent Models on Distributional Preferences
The prominent purely distributional models fall into two categories: models based on inequality aversion (B&O and F&S) and models based on altruism (C&R, C&S, A&M). Throughout this section, we denote the decision maker (or dictator) by i, his or her utility by U i , and the (monetary) payoff of person k by x k , the vector of payoffs by x, and the number of players by n.
The major difference for the present purpose between the inequality aversion models by B&O and F&S lies in the measure for inequality. In B&O, the utility function is given by U i ðx i ; s i Þ, where s i = x i P n k = 1 x k is subject i's share of the total payoff (and s i = 1 n if P n k = 1 x k = 0). For given x i ; U i is assumed to be maximal for s i = 1 n . In F&S, the utility function is given by
Hence, in B&O, subjects like the average payoff to be as close as possible to their own payoff, while in F&S, subjects dislike a payoff difference to any other individual. According to B&O, a subject would thus be equally happy if all subjects received the same payoff or if some were rich and some were poor, as long as she or he received the average payoff, but according to F&S, she or he would clearly prefer that all subjects get the same. In a real-life situation, F&S predict that the middle class would tax the upper class to subsidize the poor, whereas B&O do not.
The altruism models differ sharply from the inequality aversion models in the predicted behavior toward subjects who have a higher payoff, as they predict that a player would not pay to harm a better-off player.
6 They agree, however, with the inequality aversion models in the sense that players who are comparatively worse off than others are treated better. In C&R, this is modeled by a higher weight for the payoff of the worst-off player in the utility function. C&R present a more general utility function, and they find what they call quasi-maximin preferences to best explain the results in their (primarily dictator and ultimatum-like) experiments. Specifically, the utility function in C&R is
where g ∈ ½0; 1 reflects the relative concern for own and others' payoffs, and d ∈ ½0; 1 measures the relative weight of the lowest payoff and the total payoff. Hence, subjects care for maximizing the minimal payoff (maximin preferences) but also for efficiency.
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C&S assume convex altruistic preferences that generalize quasimaximin preferences:
Furthermore, players are assumed to be egocentric, meaning that, all else equal, they would always like to swap payoffs with another player who is better off.
8 Together with monotonicity and convexity, this implies a < 1 and 0 ≤ y < 1.
A&M present a two-player model that is similar to C&S, with
Previous Evidence from Pure Distribution Games
Evidence from the Classic Dictator Game and Its Variants
In the dictator game, the first player (''dictator'') simply chooses among a set of available allocations between himself or herself and the second player (''receiver''). In the classic dictator game (Forsythe et al. 1994 , which was aimed at better understanding the results in the ultimatum game), the dictator's task is simply to split a fixed sum of money.
Positive giving is consistent with altruism (in particular, maximin preferences) or inequality aversion, but both B&O and F&S have problems organizing the data.
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The basic dictator game has been intensively tested for robustness with respect to procedures (e.g., double blindness), subject pools, and other factors, such as increased social distance. It appears that the dictator game is less robust than other games. Double-blind procedures reduce giving by about half (Hoffmann et al. 1994; Hoffmann, McCabe, and Smith 1996) .
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The most dramatic effect, however, was found with respect to entitlement. Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002) let dictators earn the original pie through a quiz, and nearly all dictators give zero.
While it might be most surprising to an economist that double-blind procedures do not reduce the share allocated to the receiver to zero, it is noteworthy that the effects are stronger than for similar variations in the ultimatum game.
12 A possible explanation is that these variations affect distributional concerns but not other considerations such as strategic thinking or reciprocity.
The consistency of dictators' choices across several games has been addressed by A&M, who have studied the behavior of subjects across eight to eleven dictator games with different budgets and different costs of giving. They find that about 98 percent of their subjects make decisions that can be rationalized by a quasi-concave utility function but also a high degree of heterogeneity. In Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann (2006) , dictators choose between an allocation of 20 for themselves and 0 for the receiver or x for both, where x was varied between all integers from 0 to 20. 13 As A&M, they find that the vast majority of subjects are rational in the sense that if they prefer (x; x) over (20; 0) and y > x, then they also prefer (y; y) over (20; 0). However, they also find a large degree of heterogeneity.
The dictator control experiment for the trust game by Cox (2004) separates dictator giving from inequality aversion. Both dictators and receivers have an initial endowment of $10, and dictators can send part of their endowment to the receivers, which is then tripled. Among the dictators, 63 percent sent part of their endowment, which is inconsistent with inequality aversion since it generates disadvantageous inequality.
14 Since the linear quasi-maximin model predicts that dictators would send either nothing or all $10 and only 13 percent chose the latter, C&R do not add much explanatory power. C&S, in contrast, can rationalize the intermediate choices.
In general, the inferences we can draw from two-player dictator games concerning the relevance of different distributional motives are limited because in most cases, several motives coincide-for example, inequality Engelmann, Strobel / Preferences over Income Distributions 289 aversion coincides either with maximin preferences (if advantageous inequality is reduced) or with competitiveness (if disadvantageous inequality is reduced).
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Evidence from Multiplayer Dictator Games
Taking note of the limited ability of two-player dictator games to discriminate between different distributional motives (with the exception of Andreoni and Miller 2002) , it is surprising that there is a relative sparsity of dictator experiments with more than two players. To the best of our knowledge, this section contains a complete survey.
16;17 Charness and Rabin (2002) base their analysis primarily on two-player games, but they also included 3 three-player dictator games. The results are in favor of quasi-maximin preferences, with a higher weight on the maximin component than the efficiency component.
In Engelmann and Strobel (2004) , we initially aimed at discriminating between B&O and F&S, which is impossible in two-player games (except for some rather artificial cases). The dictator had a fixed, intermediate income and could choose among three different money distributions between a high-income and a low-income person. The crucial aspect of the design is that redistribution in favor of the low-income person (which would be predicted by F&S as it reduces advantageous and disadvantageous inequality) increases the difference of the dictator's share and the ''fair share'' of 1=3, so that B&O would predict redistribution in favor of the high-income person. In order to balance a possible confound of efficiency concerns, in one treatment, redistributing to the low-income subject increases the total payoff, whereas in the other, it decreases the total payoff. In the first treatment, the vast majority choose in line with F&S and efficiency; in the second, they split roughly equally between the F&S allocation and the one in line with B&O and efficiency. These results favor F&S over B&O. However, F&S coincide with maximin in these games, and F&S do not capture the difference in choices between the treatments, which clearly point to efficiency concerns. Further treatments also support C&R, but in a treatment where the dictator is the low-income individual, one third of the subjects choose contrary to C&R but in line with inequality aversion.
18 Hence, overall, the quasi-maximin model does relatively well, and the uncaptured choices can be captured by generalized versions.
While in E&S, the C&R model needed to be generalized only to rationalize relatively small shares of the data, it is more apparent in two fourplayer dictator games by C&S that the exclusive role of the minimal 290 Public Finance Review payoff is too crude a simplification. Either the minimal payoff or the total payoff is held constant across allocations, and satisfying quasi-maximin preferences comes at high costs for the second poorest person. Only a small minority choose in line with C&R. Bolton and Ockenfels (forthcoming) find similar results in a six-person dictator game. Cason and Mui (1997) compare behavior in standard two-player dictator games with that of the same subjects in a game where two dictators split a pie of double the size between themselves and two receivers, with equal shares for both dictators and for both receivers. They find that teams give more, which they find best to be explained by social comparison.
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Within the relatively small set of multiplayer dictator games, there has not yet been much room for robustness tests, but those that have been conducted point again at a relatively high sensitivity to procedural details, subject pools, and specifics of the games in question.
Fehr, Naef, and Schmidt (forthcoming [henceforth FNS]) present results of replications of two of the games in E&S. They find strong subject pool effects. While economics students in their sample decide in favor of the efficiency maximizing allocation even more frequently than in E&S (where subjects were first-year economics and business administration students), other subjects choose the inequality minimizing allocation significantly more often. They conclude that for noneconomists, the importance of efficiency concerns is lower than the results in E&S have suggested. We discuss this issue further in the next section.
A fundamental limitation of all pure distributional models is uncovered by Karni, Salmon, and Sopher (2001) . Dictators do not choose an allocation but instead choose the distribution of probabilities among three players to win a fixed pie. Although each resulting allocation is necessarily unequal (and similarly, efficiency and minimal payoff cannot be affected), they find that many subjects prefer a more equal distribution of probabilities. This indicates that fair procedures can play similar roles as fair allocations, as Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels (2005) argue . Bolton and Ockenfels (forthcoming) have studied three-person games with majority voting about the allocation. They find that subjects vote more frequently for the efficient but unequal allocation if they vote before roles are assigned, although they vote conditional on the role. This indicates that they are more willing to accept an unequal distribution if the game is embedded in a fair random procedure that gives all subjects equal opportunity to end up as the high-income individual. Ackert et al. (2005) study voting upon allocations in five-person groups and find evidence for Engelmann, Strobel / Preferences over Income Distributions 291 maximin preferences and inequality aversion but little evidence for efficiency concerns. Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2003) present a game where there is no dictator, but in a three-player game, two players have veto power. They can unilaterally enforce an equal distribution, while the third player is passive. Significantly fewer active players choose the equal distribution compared to a two-person dictator game. This suggests that distributional preferences are also sensitive to whether the decision maker has to take all the responsibility.
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In Herreiner and Puppe (2004) , fictitious objects have different value for different subjects, so that a person can be envious (i.e., would rather have another person's bundle) even if the payoff distribution is equal. They find only little evidence of envy in bargaining games, but envy appears to play some role in discriminating between three-person allocations in questionnaires.
A Large-Scale Experiment That Systematically Isolates Distributional Motives
Based on E&S, we conducted an Internet experiment using a larger set of similar games that isolated different distributional motives one at a time in order to study their relative roles more systematically. We also systematically varied the impact of the choice on the decision maker's payoff (for details, see Engelmann and Strobel 2006) . Two thousand subjects, regular participants in a panel of a marketing institute, were invited to participate. In total, 1,103 responded to the inquiry, of which 872 had to make choices in ten simple three-person distribution games, including one game where the actual payoffs for all three allocations they could choose from were randomly generated within certain intervals. The remaining participants had to make choices in eight five-person games (217 subjects) or in only one three-person game (14 subjects). Subjects were paid on a random basis. 21 Two key advantages of our Internet experiment over traditional laboratory experiments are that it allowed us to recruit a very large number of subjects, and these participants had more varied backgrounds than those who can easily be recruited for a laboratory experiment. A possible disadvantage is that such an Internet experiment naturally allows for less control than a laboratory experiment. We have, however, taken precautions to minimize possible problems. For example, once participants had opened their questionnaire, it was not possible to access another questionnaire by logging off and on again. Furthermore, we got detailed biographic data on all subjects from the marketing institute.
The three-person games other than the random games were designed such that each motive that we considered potentially relevant was isolated in at least one game (we cannot isolate the b-component of F&S since it either coincides with maximin preferences or efficiency concerns). This means that there was only one allocation that was predicted by this motive, and we systematically varied the costs for choosing this allocation. For example, the game in table 1 isolated efficiency concerns, where the costs x differed across subjects. Only efficiency concerns (eff) would predict the choice of allocation A, whereas maximin preferences (mxm) and generosity (gen, the b-component of F&S) are irrelevant (since the decision maker has the lowest payoff). Competitiveness (cmp), envy (env, the a-component of F&S), inequality aversion in the form of B&O (iav), and selfishness (slf, for x > 0) predict C. In this game, 38 percent choose the efficient allocation when it is free, but the share decreases when this implies positive costs.
Overall, the results confirmed our conclusions from E&S. Efficiency concerns and maximin preferences appear to be more important than inequality aversion, although the role of efficiency seems to be weakened. In particular, an allocation that maximizes both efficiency and the minimal payoff is in all three-player games chosen by a wide majority, and this is robust to varying the costs for the decision maker by 0 to 5 euros. When Table 1 Example for Three-Player Games in Engelmann and Strobel (2006) we isolate B&O-type inequality aversion or competitiveness, they do very poorly (less than 10 percent of choices). Envy appears to be more important, covering 10 to 25 percent of choices. The strong role of inequality aversion relative to efficiency concerns that FNS found in games from E&S with noneconomists appeared at odds with the results from our Internet experiment, which used a broader sample of subjects. 22 We hence suspected that while the subjects in their first control experiment might care more for equality, they might be equally unrepresentative of the general population as the economics students.
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A closer look at our data reveals similar subject pool effects as FNS when we classify our subjects into groups with unambiguous economics backgrounds, unambiguous noneconomics backgrounds, and ambiguous backgrounds (the latter including loosely economics-related fields such as accounting or cases of insufficient information). The subject pool effects are, however, weaker and not consistent across games (for details, see Engelmann and Strobel 2006) . Hence, we do not think that the available data on subject pool effects allow for the conclusion that efficiency concerns are of minor importance for noneconomists.
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In a conditional logit analysis for the games with randomly chosen payoffs, 25 restricted to the subjects who had either an unambiguous economics background or an unambiguous noneconomics background, we find a significant impact of efficiency and maximin, but not of inequality aversion, neither according to the measure by B&O (iav) nor for the separate components of the F&S model. We also find a positive but insignificant interaction effect between efficiency and an economist dummy (see table 2) . 26 Restricting the analysis to unambiguous noneconomists yields significant effects for efficiency (p < :001) and maximin (p = :001) and marginally for iav (p = :062Þ. In contrast, for economists, only efficiency is significant (p = :001Þ. For the ambiguous cases, efficiency (p < :001Þ, maximin (p < :001Þ, FSaðp = :039Þ, and iav (p = :037Þ are significant, whereas FSb has a marginally significant (p = :059Þ negative impact, and competitiveness is also marginally significant (p = :093Þ.
27 Thus, we also find that economists care more for efficiency, but efficiency is also of substantial importance for noneconomists.
Overall, the results in Engelmann and Strobel (2006) reveal a high degree of heterogeneity among subjects. Moreover, most subjects appear to be driven by a mixture of motives. This is best illustrated by figure 1. It shows for each motive the distribution of subjects with respect to the number of games in which they chose consistently with that motive (among the ten choices they made in three-player games). Figure 1 reveals that very few subjects appear to be driven by a single dominant motive and that the only motives for which a nontrivial share of subjects chose consistently with this motive in all ten games are maximin preferences (14:6 percent), efficiency concerns (8:3 percent), and selfishness (10:1 percent). It is particularly interesting that for these three motives, more dictators are consistent in all ten games than in nine games. This suggests that these subjects were clearly guided by the respective (for them) dominating motive and that the consistency was not an artifact of coinciding with other motives.
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Note that all the models considered allow for a combination of several motives (at least for the combination of selfishness and one or more other motives). For example, a person with consistent C&R preferences does not necessarily have to decide in line with maximin or with efficiency in all games but only with selfishness, maximin, or efficiency. Similarly, a subject with consistent F&S preferences would not have to be in line with envy all the time. However, in all except for one type of game (plus possibly the game with randomly generated payoffs), the differences between allocations in terms of the a-component of F&S are larger than those in terms of the b-component. Furthermore, the costs in terms of the decision maker's own payoff are generally smaller than the changes in terms of the a-and b-components. We can derive that at least all subjects with a i ≥ 1 should choose consistently with the envy motive in at least eight games. Only 9.06 percent do so, substantially below the 40 percent of subjects with a i ≥ 1 that F&S assume in order to explain various experimental results.
In the five-player dictator games in Engelmann and Strobel (2006) , each participant made eight choices, being the person with the second highest payoff in six games and with the third highest in two games. 29 In all these games, efficiency concerns and maximin preferences always coincide. In half of these games, however, increasing the lowest and the total payoff comes at relatively high costs in terms of the second lowest payoff. In these games, fewer subjects decide in line with C&R than in the three-player games (and more subjects decide in line with F&S), but C&R do better when the trade-off is more in its favor. This is in line with the six-player games of Bolton and Ockenfels (forthcoming) and the fourplayer games in C&S since in all these games, increasing the minimal payoff comes at high costs for other relatively poor players. Hence, the C&R model is also a simplification that can lead to misleading predictions in games with many players, and in these games, generalizations such as C&S will be more accurate.
If we look again at the consistency across games (see figure 2) , we see that a relative high share of subjects (14.3 percent) decides consistently with quasi-maximin preferences in all games. Since efficiency concerns and maximin preferences always coincide in these games, however, the data are biased in their favor since each subject who cares for one of these motives or any combination of them would choose consistently with both of them in all games.
While the results reported so far are largely in favor of C&S, at least one of our games provides evidence against C&S (see again table 1). If x = 0, then by choosing C instead of B, the dictator only affects the highest payoff, and 35.2 percent chose this option. This could be driven by competitiveness and by envy. As we find very little evidence in favor of competitiveness in general, envy seems to be the driving motive here.
The arguably most interesting result of our experiment concerns the prevalence of selfishness. Previous experiments have indicated that increasing the social distance leads to an increase in selfish behavior in standard dictator games. Although the social distance in an Internet experiment is quite high-and in this experiment, the participants were further removed from the experimenters since the marketing institute served as a buffer 30 -we find a comparatively high number of nonselfish choices. For example, when we isolate selfishness, less than 20 percent of subjects choose accordingly, and in seven out of sixteen distinct three-player games, the majority of choices violates strict selfishness. Furthermore, only 10 percent of subjects made a choice consistent with selfishness in all ten three-player games (22 percent in eight or more games, 15 percent in all eight five-player games). Our experiment even underestimates the share of subjects who would be willing to sacrifice their own payoff to satisfy their distributional preferences since in many cases, their narrow self-interest certainly coincided with their distributional preferences. The frequent violation of narrow self-interest probably results from the fact that the costs were small compared to the changes the dictator could cause in other participants' payoffs. Previous results that suggest that with high social distance, the majority of subjects become perfectly selfish, appear to be driven by relatively high costs of giving.
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A Generalized Quasi-Maximin Model
The results of three-player dictator games are overall in favor of C&R. Tests with more players, however, revealed that the quasi-maximin model is too simple as subjects are not willing to reduce the payoffs of other relatively low-income subjects substantially to increase the minimal payoff a bit. C&S capture this by assuming concavity of the utility function both in the dictator's as well as other persons' payoffs. We consider here an alternative generalization of the linear quasi-maximin model that takes the payoff ranking explicitly into account.
Consider a dictator game with n players with a countable set of possible allocations (this is hardly a restriction and is only necessary to order the allocations, which eases the notation). Order the payoffs to different players for each allocation in descending order such that for allocation r, x r i ≥ x r k if k > i: Note that this implies that in different allocations r; s; payoff x r i ; x s i can refer to different players since, for example, different players might be the highest payoff subject in different allocations. Since we assume dictators to be concerned exclusively with the distribution of the payoffs without feeling special sympathy with respect to specific player ''names,'' this is not problematic. 32 As the experiments of C&S show, the linear quasi-maximin model is problematic. Hence, we assume the dictator's utility function to be (weakly) concave in his or her own payoff.
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Let d r be the position of the dictator in allocation r after ordering the payoffs. The utility of the dictator from allocation r is then assumed to be where g 1 ≤ g 2 ≤ ::: ≤ g n−1 ≤ g n and u 0 ≥ maxf0; − g 1 g, u 00 ≤ 0. 34 Note that the dictator's own payoff also appears in the sum. Hence, for a dictator who is completely guided by social concerns and treats himself or herself just like any other person, u = 0.
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This model can capture pure selfishness, g 1 = ::: = g n = 0; pure maximin preferences, g 1 = ::: = g n−1 = 0; g n > 0; pure efficiency concerns, g 1 = ::: = g n > 0; quasi-maximin preferences, 0 < g 1 = ::: = g n−1 < g n ; and various versions of competitiveness (the latter may take forms where a dictator wants to increase his or her own share at the expense of all other players or only of relatively well-off players), g 1 ≤ g 2 ≤ ::: ≤ g n−1 ≤ g n ≤ 0 and g 1 < 0. Generalized quasi-maximin preferences would correspond to 0 ≤ g 1 ≤ g 2 ≤ ::: ≤ g n−1 ≤ g n , with at least one inequality strict.
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Although the model also captures preferences that are altruistic toward relatively poor players and at the same time competitive toward relatively rich players, g 1 ≤ g 2 ≤ ::: ≤ g n − 1 ≤ g n and g 1 < 0 < g n , it does not capture inequality aversion. In the B&O model, the relative position of the other players' payoffs is irrelevant, as only the relative payoff of the dictator matters, so all weights should be equal, but whether they are positive or negative would depend on the relative payoff of the dictator. To include the F&S model as a special case, one would also have to take the dictator's position into account-that is, the F&S model corresponds to g 1 = ::: = g d r −1 ≤ 0 ≤ g d r +1 = ::: = g n . 37 Here, however, we assume that the weights g i are independent of the dictator's position in the ranking, and hence the model does not include general versions of inequality aversion either. Our model can capture inequality aversion in two-player games by assigning weights g 1 < 0 < g 2 . Already with three players, however, it assumes that whether the dictator is altruistic or competitive toward the intermediate-payoff player is independent of whether the dictator has the highest or lowest payoff of the three players. The amount the dictator would pay to help or hurt the intermediate player would, however, change since the utility function is concave in the dictator's own payoff. Contrary to inequality aversion, however, if the dictator pays something to harm the intermediate-payoff player when he or she is the low-payoff player, the dictator would pay even more (or at least as much) if he or she was the high-payoff player.
The model does not imply that the dictator's altruism or competitiveness is independent of his or her position. Since one weight applies to the dictator's own payoff, if he or she has another payoff rank, the dictator's concern for others' payoffs might change. For example, a dictator who has pure maximin preferences becomes perfectly selfish if he or she has the lowest payoff.
In contrast to C&S, this model allows for preferences that are generally altruistic but envious toward the richest player(s), which would be consistent with the observed behavior in the game in table 1. Furthermore, it appears unintuitive that C&S are insensitive to the ranking of payoffs. For illustration, assume that a dictator has $100 and can increase a recipient's payoff who already has $20. Assume, furthermore, that there are two more players, who receive $x, and that the dictator cannot affect their payoff. C&S now predict that the dictator's willingness to pay to increase the recipient's payoff is independent of x. We consider this unintuitive and would expect, as our model predicts, that the dictator would pay more to increase the recipient's payoff if, for example, x = 50, than if x = 2. On the other hand, one might consider it unintuitive that, as our model (as well as C&S) predicts, it is irrelevant whether x = 19 or x = 1. This is, however, an empirical question, and we are unaware of clarifying evidence. Naturally, this model in its general form can rationalize almost all choices of dictators. Hence, without any restrictions on the parameters, it is not useful to derive predictions for behavior in new situations. In particular, if n increases, at some point, the number of free parameters becomes too large. The model might, however, be a more practical starting point than previous models. The way this model should be used is to let individual players make a decision in a large set of dictator games that offer sufficient variation in the payoffs and number of players. One can then estimate the parameter vector for each player and try to detect frequent combinations and general patterns. For example, it might prove not to be very restrictive to assume that for n exceeding a certain threshold n (possibly of the order about 5), we can fix n parameters and determine the remaining parameters by linear interpolation. Similarly, one might detect that for many players, only g 1 and g n prove to be significantly different from the other parameters, and hence a relatively small extension of quasi-maximin preferences would work well.
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In contrast to previous approaches that started with a simple model and then argued how the model could be extended to cover additional data, this approach starts with a very general model and then narrows it down. Moreover, our conditional logit model above suffers from collinearity problems, while this approach does not. Nevertheless, it allows us to distinguish between the crucial aspects of various motives. For example, the crucial distinction between inequality aversion and efficiency concerns is whether an increase in a richer person's payoff increases or decreases Engelmann, Strobel / Preferences over Income Distributions 301 one's own utility. This can be easily assessed here with a conditional logit that takes the other player's payoffs as arguments.
39
Even if the attempt to determine parameter distributions that would narrow down the above model to a more tractable one would not prove to be fruitful, estimating the parameters of the model might still be useful to provide a deeper understanding of the dependence of distributional preferences on subject pools, procedural details, and so on because variations could be reflected in systematic changes of weights. For example, the preliminary evidence suggests that economists have flatter weight schedules (i.e., their weights on poor players relative to rich players are lower than for noneconomists), and a random role assignment might also make schedules flatter. Extending the scope beyond pure distributional games, if another player has harmed the decision maker before, this would be expected to lead to a decrease of the weight attached to this person (negative reciprocity).
40 This might again interact with different procedural aspects. Similarly, sharing responsibility for the outcome appears to lower all weights on others' payoffs. Such a multiparameter model where we understand the regularities more and more might prove more useful than simple models that fail if their distinctive characteristics are tested directly.
Econometric Test
For illustration, we test the generalized quasi-maximin model for the five-person games in Engelmann and Strobel (2006) . We run a conditional logistic regression with the decision maker's payoff as well as the payoffs of the players ordered by their rank as independent variables. 41 This model does not take care of the statistical dependence of the eight decisions by each subject, and hence the results should be taken with care and rather be seen as an illustration. Moreover, this is not the approach that we would consider the most fruitful to make use of the model (i.e., estimating parameters for individual subjects based on a large number of decisions by each subject). Our Internet experiment was not designed to test this model and hence does not provide enough data per subject, but it is still the richest data set we have for a preliminary test.
The results are in table 3. We report odds ratios, with an odds ratio larger than 1 indicating that an increase in the respective payoffs leads to an increase in the probability of the allocation to be chosen. 42 The results are to a large part consistent with generalized quasi-maximin preferences. As expected, the dictator's payoff has a clearly significant positive impact on the probability of the allocation to be chosen. All payoffs except for the second highest have a significant positive impact, consistent with altruistic concerns dominating competitive concerns. Furthermore, the odds ratios are higher for the lower ranks, with the exception of the second highest, consistent with a higher degree of altruism toward poorer players. The odds ratio for the second highest ranked payoff is (insignificantly) smaller than 1. This might be explained by the fact that in all but one of our games, the dictator had the second highest rank, 43 and hence the estimates for this rank are driven by this game alone. This exercise illustrates that the proposed model might be a good starting point for estimating distributional concerns and their interactions with procedural aspects (in a broad sense, e.g., including the choice of the subject pool) of the experiments. For the three-person games, the results are clearly consistent with our model. The odds ratios for self, x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 are 1.202, 1.009, 1.055, and 1.156, respectively, and all except the one for x 1 are significantly larger than 1.
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Conclusion
Reviewing the evidence on purely distributional games, where distributional preferences should be unconfounded by reciprocity and strategic concerns, we conclude that we know relatively little about distributional preferences. This contrasts with their prominent role in models designed to explain behavior in experiments. One might go as far as labeling this a distribution paradox. There are nearly as many theories of human behavior that only take the distribution of payoffs as arguments as there are distinct, purely distributional games that have been used to test these. While some of the results are encouraging (i.e., the finding by A&M that almost all subjects behave consistently with some utility function), the same authors also find that subjects' preferences are highly heterogeneous. That alone would not be too much reason for concern as long as it were possible to find robust estimates of the shares that decide consistently with different motives. A review of the literature, however, reveals that such a robust estimation seems difficult to achieve as the shares of subjects that decide in line with different motives differ substantially across games, and a large number of motives seem to matter at least in some games.
To further complicate matters, dictator experiments appear to be more sensitive to procedures, subject pools, and further aspects than other experiments. Consequently, preferences over distributions appear to be less robust with respect to these issues than other considerations such as reciprocity or strategic concerns. Apparently, for example, a subject's willingness to share with another subject decreases with larger social distance, but the desire to punish unfriendly acts or reward friendly acts is less affected.
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The most successful model in explaining distributional choices seems to be generalized maximin (i.e., altruistic preferences that assign higher weights to the players lower in the payoff ranking). C&S capture this in an elegant functional form. For a complete explanation, one needs, however, to factor in a small (5-10 percent) share of players who are competitive, wanting to maximize their own relative payoff (which corresponds to nonpositive weights in the generalized quasi-maximin model). There is also evidence that in addition to the competitive subjects, a few players like to reduce others' payoffs just because the others are richer. This is consistent with inequality aversion. 46 It also seems that perfect equality can serve as a focal point and has special appeal. When there is no reason to give an advantage to any person and there are no substantial costs in terms of efficiency, a perfectly equal allocation seems obviously attractive. When perfect equality is not an option, the willingness of subjects to trade off other concerns (e.g., efficiency or maximin) for a reduction in inequality seems to be reduced, 47 although this issue awaits systematic investigation.
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To summarize, we know surprisingly little about distributional preferences. A large variety of motives appear to matter, and which of them dominates is influenced by many aspects of the game and the experimental design. While the impact of some of the factors is to be expected by economists (e.g., the introduction of double-blind procedures), the influence of other factors is difficult to rationalize within an economic framework (e.g., the availability of a perfectly equal split). Further research, exposing individual subjects to a large variety of games, should inform the formulation of models that can capture the former aspects in a systematic way. Capturing the latter aspects in a tractable formal model, however, appears much more challenging.
Notes
1. The ultimatum game is a two-player game where the first mover, the proposer, suggests a division of a fixed amount of money between himself and the second mover, the receiver. The receiver can accept or reject. If she or he accepts, the proposal is implemented; if she or he rejects, both players receive nothing. While the subgame-perfect equilibrium for rational selfish players predicts that proposers will offer the receivers the minimal positive amount (or even nothing) and receivers will accept all positive (or even all) offers, the very large set of ultimatum experiments shows that offers are substantially higher (and very often equal half of the pie) and receivers frequently reject offers of less than 25 percent of the pie (see Camerer 2003) .
2. In a slight abuse of notation, we will use the same abbreviation for groups of authors as well as for their models or experimental studies where appropriate.
3. We understand reciprocity here as actions rewarding intentionally helpful actions (positive reciprocity) and punishing intentionally hurtful actions (negative reciprocity).
4. Indeed, in his very comprehensive book, Camerer (2003) cites no purely distributional experiment with more than two players, except the three-person dictator games by Frey and Bohnet (1997) .
5. Further papers attempt to isolate the effects of distributional concerns and reciprocity by comparing treatments where second movers react to free choices of first movers to those where first-mover choices are replaced by random draws (e.g., Charness 2004), or the strategy space of player 1 is restricted such that he or she could not have acted in any friendlier way (e.g., Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels 1998; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2003) .
6. Extensions of these models that include negative reciprocity (Charness and Rabin 2002; Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad forthcoming) allow for punishment of players if they have behaved unfriendly before.
7. We will always refer to efficiency plainly as the sum of payoffs for all subjects. 8. The same holds for Fehr and Schmidt (1999 [F&S] ) because b < 1, but it does not hold in general for Bolton and Ockenfels (2000 [B&O] ) as players might dislike advantageous inequality enough to prefer to receive an intermediate payoff.
9. In an earlier dictator game (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986) , the dictator could only choose between an equal split of $20 or keeping $18 and giving the recipient $2. The 76 percent who chose the equal split are much higher than in other experiments, probably because only one very biased alternative was available.
10. The linear utility function in F&S is only consistent with the corner-point choices, except for b = 1=2. In contrast, the model of B&O cannot explain sending exactly half the pie (at least if the strategy space is sufficiently fine).
11. Further increasing social distance seems to lower dictator giving only slightly further. For example, recipients in Johannesson and Persson (2000) were randomly selected from the Swedish adult population, and their allocations were mailed. Frey (1999a, 1999b) and Charness and Gneezy (forthcoming) find that decreasing social distance significantly increases dictator giving, but the latter find no such effect in ultimatum games. 14. Kritikos and Bolle (2001) also find strong evidence in favor of efficiency concerns and contrary to inequality aversion in two-player dictator games, where dictators choose between payoff allocations that are similar to the options for responders in ultimatum games.
15. Competitiveness is understood as a desire to maximize one's own relative payoff. 16. For a more detailed discussion of these experiments, see the extended survey on the first author's homepage that is based on a previous version of this article.
17. An early three-player dictator game was conducted by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) , but dictators knew the choices of the two recipients in preceding two-player dictator games, so this game is clearly influenced by indirect reciprocity. Frey and Bohnet (1997) studied three-player dictator games where the dictator could freely share a fixed sum of money with two recipients. The focus of their study is the effect of communication.
18. The latter choices are also consistent with Cox and Sadiraj (2006 [C&S] ) as disadvantageous inequality is reduced by lowering the payoff of the high-income subject substantially while increasing the payoff of the intermediate-income person. Alternatively, this behavior can also be captured by a generalized quasi-maximin model that we discuss below.
19. This behavior is also consistent with C&S since a dictator, by demanding less, also redistributes between the second dictator and the second receiver. In contrast, Charness and Rabin (2002 [C&R] ) predict that the decision should be the same, while F&S would even predict that teams give less. The treatment effects are, however, rather weak.
20. This is similar to the ''complicity effect'' identified by Charness and Rabin (2002) . See also Camerer (2003) .
21. In total, we paid 3,505 euros to 110 participants. We took the choice in one randomly selected game for 20 randomly selected persons and paid them as well as 48 randomly selected recipients. To control for effects of the mechanism, 14 additional subjects made only one choice (all for the same game) and knew that this choice would be implemented for sure (with 28 randomly selected recipients). Comparing their choices with those subjects having faced the same choice as one of ten games yields no significant or substantial difference.
22. Our sample differs substantially from student subject pools. For example, 29 percent did not have a college or university degree, 34 percent had children, and 28 percent were forty years or older. Similarly, in C&R, the sessions that were run at Berkeley did not employ economics students and strongly support their model.
23. In line with this interpretation, employees and law and medicine students that Fehr, Naef, and Schmidt (forthcoming [FNS] ) used in Zurich were a bit more efficiency minded than the Munich noneconomists, who were primarily social sciences students. The difference was, however, not significant. 24. In this context, it is also noteworthy that while FNS find significant differences between economists and noneconomists, in only one of the games they investigate, the data show indeed that the noneconomists choose the efficient allocation significantly less often than the subjects in Engelmann and Strobel (2004 [E&S] ). In the second game, their economists choose the efficient allocation significantly more often than the E&S subjects, while the noneconomists do not differ significantly from the E&S data. Hence, it is not clear from their results how representative the E&S data are for the population at large. Furthermore, there are some differences in procedures to E&S. See Engelmann and Strobel (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion.
25. We restrict the analysis to the random payoff games because each subject only made one choice in such a game. Hence, we can treat the choices as independent observations. Moreover, in the random payoff games, we have by design much more variation with respect to the different motives, which reduces the impact of individual games.
26. The insignificance of the interaction effect may partly be due to the comparably low number of economists (85) versus noneconomists (255). Of the subjects, 532 had ambiguous backgrounds.
27. The motives are highly correlated, which makes the analysis sensitive to the exclusion of certain motives. Due to a collinearity problem, we have to drop one variable. We excluded selfishness here. Alternatively, as we did in E&S, we can include selfishness and replace the FSa and FSb components by FSstrict = FSa + FSb, assuming equal weights on aversion toward disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. In this case, we get no changes for competitiveness, iav, maximin, and the interaction effect. Efficiency is still significant at p = :02, but selfishness (p = :32) and FSstrict (p = :42) are not. Excluding FSb instead of selfishness changes the level of significance for efficiency to p = :04.
28. In contrast, the high number of subjects who are consistent with generosity in seven to nine games might well be driven by the fact that for all subjects, generosity and maximin preferences have coincided for seven to nine out of the ten games.
29. Each participant faced four different games twice, with the only difference being how the decision maker's payoff varied across allocations.
30. Our experiments were double blind since we were not given participants' names, and subjects were informed about this in the instructions.
31. Charness, Haruvy, and Sonsino (forthcoming) also find a relatively high number of nonselfish choices in an Internet experiment based on a lost-wallet game.
32. It would become an issue if we extended the model to capture further aspects such as reciprocity because, for example, a player who has misbehaved would receive a lower weight in all allocations, which requires keeping track of the player numbers in the sorting of payoffs as well.
33. Probably assuming concavity in all players' payoffs is more appropriate, but then the model is untractable.
34. If the payoffs for two or more players are identical, the weight they receive should be identical and equal to the mean of the corresponding general weights. This ensures continuity of the utility function where two players' payoffs are equal. The condition on u 0 ensures that a dictator who is competitive with respect to relatively rich players would not be willing to reduce his or her own payoff if he or she became the richest player.
35. If a dictator has a higher payoff rank (but the same payoff), his or her marginal utility is smaller since g i−1 ≤ g i . Together with the concavity of u, this guarantees that the dictator's utility is concave in his or her own payoff. Furthermore, since the sum in U d is unaffected by swapping payoffs between two persons, the model preserves the egocentricity property of C&S.
36. C&R appear to have had such a model in mind-namely, that players care more for others the lower their position is in the ranking of payoffs and consider quasi-maximin preferences as a simplification.
37. Generalized versions of F&S would allow for weak inequalities instead of equalities in this expression.
38. Alternatively, one could try to derive the parameters from a more general model that has fewer parameters. For example, altruistic preferences that favor relatively poor others could be captured by a model that suggests maximization of a function uðx i Þ + WE, where W is the total payoff and E a measure for the equality of the distribution. A sensible measure would be E = 1 − G, with G the Gini coefficient, which amounts here to G = 
